Framing the Web 3.0's incentive problem

ANONYMOUS: There's a long continuum of data ownership:
  1. evilcorp has your data and you can't see it
  2. evilcorp has your data and offers filtered access via a UI
  3. evilcorp has your data and offers snapshots / queries
  4. evilcorp has your data and lets you mirror it effectively
  5. you have your data but let evilcorp mirror it effectively
  6. you have your data but offer evilcorp queries
Each step in this is better than the last. At the last step, I consider evilcorp tamed, to the extent that any such thing can be tamed. But you advance in this fight step by step, and evilcorp by evilcorp. I don't have a silver bullet and I'm skeptical that there is one.

MYERSON: Of course the social problems of poverty actually arise in complex social systems where different equilibria are much harder to identify than in this simple example. In a game that has many equilibria, there are typically many more strategy combinations that are not Nash equilibria. A would-be reformer who wants to improve social welfare by changing people's behavior to a better equilibrium must take care to identify a social plan that is in fact a Nash equilibrium, so that nobody can profit by unilaterally deviating from the plan. If a leader tries to change people's expectations to some plan that is not a Nash equilibrium, then his exhortations to change behavior would be undermined by rational deviations. The point of this example is that, even when the better equilibrium is well understood, there still remains a nontrivial social problem of how to change everyone's expectations to the better equilibrium. Such coordinated social change requires some form of socially accepted leadership, and thus it may depend on factors that are essentially political. — Myerson, Roger B. 2009. "Learning from Schelling's Strategy of Conflict." Journal of Economic Literature, 47 (4): 1109-25.